UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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PENTACON BV, et al., : Case No.: 23cv2172

Plaintiffs, :

V.

VANDERHAEGEN, et al., : New York, New York

Defendants. : May 19, 2023

----: CONFERENCE

TRANSCRIPT OF STATUS CONFERENCE HEARING

BEFORE THE HONORABLE KATHERINE POLK FAILLA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff: DECHERT, LLP

BY: Steven B. Feirson, Esq.

Matthew Mazur, Esq.

2929 Arch Street

Philadelphia, PA 19104

For Defendants: NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, LLP

BY: Thomas J. McCormack, Esq.

Robin Ball, Esq. Robert Kirby, Esq.

1301 Avenue of the Americas

New York, New York 10019

For Defendant: LATHAM & WATKINS, LLP

Origis BY: Blake T. Denton, Esq.

1271 Avenue of the Americas New York, New York 10020

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                 THE DEPUTY CLERK: Your Honor, this is in
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     the matter of Pentacon BV, et al., versus
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     Vanderhaegen, et al.
                 Counsel, please state your name for the
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      record, beginning with plaintiffs.
                MR. FEIRSON: Steve Feirson on behalf of
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     the plaintiffs from Dechert.
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                 THE COURT: Sir, good morning.
                                                 This is
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     Judge Failla. Assisting you this morning is who,
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     please?
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                MR. MAZER: Good morning, Your Honor.
     Matthew Mazur from Dechert as well.
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                 THE COURT: There we go. Thank you, sir.
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     And good morning to you.
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                 Representing Mr. Vanderhaegen and the
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     Pelican entities, may I have an appearance, please.
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                 MR. McCORMACK: Yes. Good morning, Your
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     Honor. This is Tom McCormack, and I'm with my
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     colleagues, Robin Ball and Bob Kirby from Norton
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     Rose Fulbright, on behalf of Vanderhaegen,
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     Vanderhaegen Trust and the Pelican entities.
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                 THE COURT: Sir, thank you so much.
                                                      And
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     good morning to you as well.
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                And then representing Origis USA LLC?
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                MR. DENTON: Good morning, Your Honor.
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     Blake Denton from Latham & Watkins for Origis USA
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     LLC.
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                 THE COURT: Thank you, sir.
                 And there's no one represent -- are you
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     also representing Origis Energy LLC, sir?
                 MR. DENTON: No.
                                   That would be the
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     Norton Rose -- one of the Norton Rose parties.
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                 THE COURT: Okay.
                                    Thank you.
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                 And, Mr. McCormack, are you volunteering
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      for Origis Energy LLC?
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                 MR. McCORMACK: Actually, that entity no
      longer exists. So we are, yes. So to the extent
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     that it had any role in any of these matters, we
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     would be representing it.
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                 THE COURT: Okay. I very much appreciate
      the clarification.
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                 Good morning to each of you this morning.
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      Thank you very much for participating in this, our
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     initial conference in this case, which is also a
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     pre-motion conference in this case. In preparation
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      for this proceeding, I've reviewed the complaint and
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     the removal notice, and I've reviewed as well the
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     pre-motion letters and plaintiffs' responses to
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     them.
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                 Looking through the materials I have, I
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don't actually think I have a copy of the share redemption agreement, so, to a degree, I am limited in my knowledge because I haven't had a chance to review it. I suspect that I will not be able to persuade the defendants, the extant defendants, from moving to dismiss the claims against their respect -- each of them. And so, instead, I guess I'd like to just understand a little bit more about the case, and as well to understand from plaintiffs whether they wish to amend their complaint before motion practice.

I do understand that prior to the removal, there had been an agreed-upon motion to dismiss briefing scheduled. But, again, I don't want to have the situation where a motion to dismiss is filed and it's responded to with a proposed amended complaint. So I'd like to get that out of the way now. And then just, again, as I mentioned a few moments ago, I don't have the SRA, so I'm, sort of, speaking from a position of ignorance in some respects. But I was having -- and I'd like to engage with plaintiffs' counsel on this. I was having a little difficulty with some of the arguments, in particular the alter-ego arguments with respect to Mr. Vanderhaegen.

So let me ask Mr. Feirson if -- first, whether there's an appetite for amendment, and second, if he could engage with me on my issues with their alter ego. Thank you.

MR. FEIRSON: Yes, thank you, Your Honor. This is Mr. Feirson.

The -- there is, as there always is in a situation like this, an appetite, having seen the three-page letters, to consider whether some amendment could take place which would clarify some of the claims, and I think here we can probably do that. We can certainly attempt, even though it's prediscovery and before we see any motion to dismiss, to flesh out the alter-ego point.

We -- the complaint -- the benefit, at least we thought, of the complaint being as lengthy and detailed as it was, was that it set forth a lot of the interaction. But some of it, as it pertains specifically to the alter-ego point, probably not as clear as it might have been.

So, yes, with respect to the alter-ego point and the -- whether it's an aiding and abetting point that goes along with the alter-ego point, we would have an interest in amending to try to clarify that.

THE COURT: Let me understand this well, sir, your position with respect to the release. As I understand it, Mr. Vanderhaegen and his team believe that it bars all of these claims, and you —is it really the case that there's a carve-out for fraud? I simply don't know. I haven't seen the document.

MR. FEIRSON: Yeah, well -- and we apologize to the Court because we obviously should have -- someone should have supplied the Court with the SRA. But, yeah, there is -- there are carve-outs, and the carve-outs appear in Section 4.8 and Section 8.6(a). And this specific lead-in language, including the language if you look at 9.11, which is what Norton Rose points to, says, "except to the extent provided in the transaction documents." So the waiver is predicated and conditioned on the fact that there be nothing else in the transaction documents that in any way would undercut that.

And if you look at 4.8, it carves out quoting cases of fraud, also carves out cases that depend on Article 4. And 8.6, similarly, the exact wording is, "except for claims based on fraud," so yeah. So, I mean, our position is -- and you can --

we will be able to see it, and would have been able had someone provided the Court with the SRA, that, yeah, there are, in fact, these carve-outs.

THE COURT: And, sir, I appreciate you beating yourself up, I do, but just to be clear, you didn't know the case was coming to me. And maybe somewhere in the state court file, it's there. I just don't have it in the materials I've received.

Mr. Feirson, you'll excuse me for asking this because, for me, it is the triumph of hope over experience, but is there any discussion, or has there been any discussion, regarding a pre-motion ADR proceeding, either a settlement conference or a mediation before we get into what, for me, is going to be some pretty extensive motion practice.

MR. FEIRSON: There's an -- I think my colleagues would agree with this. At least with respect to the Norton Rose parties, there's been a very, sort of, superficial, cursory discussion about that, which I think didn't go very far because it ended more with, well, maybe we ought to see what the motion to dismiss stage looks like first, or at least have some fact discovery first. But I wouldn't say that we had any serious discussion about that.

THE COURT: All right. No, I appreciate that. Okay.

Mr. Feirson, those were the questions that I had for you, sir. I do want to hear from defense counsel, but before I do, is there anything that you want to call to my attention that you believe might not be as clear as you want it to, either in the complaint or in the pre motion correspondence?

MR. FEIRSON: Again, I would -- I'd go back to the fact that a lot of the items that were set forth in the admittedly very brief three-page letter from the Norton Rose parties and from Latham is -- has its answer in various allegations in the complaint and/or in the SRA itself. And so any process which can lay that out for the Court in greater detail, I think, would be beneficial for all -- for everyone.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much.

Mr. McCormack, I'll turn to you, sir.

And, Mr. McCormack, I appreciate your clients'
desires -- your clients', plural, desires to have
this case dismissed, but, you know, as cases go, as
complaints go, it was pretty detailed. So I can
hear from you with respect to the relief provision

or with respect to anything else that you've heard me discuss with Mr. Feirson this morning, or you can stand on your written submissions.

MR. McCORMACK: Well, thank you. I appreciate the opportunity this morning to speak with you.

Let me cover a couple of things first, which is you are correct. We think that we have several bases on both legal and pleadings issues to have these claims dismissed. And I think that's -- you said correctly at the outset that we were inclined to do that. We remain inclined to do that. And I appreciate the inquiry.

Relative to this -- remember, this is a contract that was signed by certain parties, and then there's non-signatories to this contract. And, obviously, to the extent that one seeks to bring breach of contract claims against a non-signatory, that's a fundamental problem. And that -- that's true with several of our defendants. And then -- so that's with regard to the breach of contract claims, generally.

Now, with regard to the release, I think -- and you are at disadvantage not having the SRA in front of you. I mean, the SRA is exactly

what you think it is. It's a part -- remember, these are immensely sophisticated people. The sellers to my client are very successful, wealthy, private equity types in Belgium, and they got into this contract. And it's one of those classic contracts -- I'm sure you've seen it, Your Honor -- a very, very sophisticated contract with people that very carefully lay out what the -- what claims are in and what claims are out, et cetera. And you'll see that when you see the agreement. And they made the decision to sell making three times their money, and they now have, as we said, seller's regret, but I have a set piece here, but I won't bore you with it. I'll just get to your question.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. McCORMACK: I'll get to your question, which is relative -- I think that when you read the relevant sections of this agreement, first of all, the release is completely valid against the three non-parties that we're seeking to get out of the case. And that's because 9.11, as Mr. Feirson, said, excludes from its broad scope only hypothetical claims that are pursuant to and to the extent provided in the transaction documents.

But Section 4.8, which, apparently, he's

relying upon, does not provide for claims against non-party affiliates. To the contrary, that section is a disclaimer of additional representation and warranties made by contracting parties or any of their respective affiliates or representatives. It does not purport to affirmatively create any claims or liabilities. The plaintiffs' reading of Section 4.8 is also inconsistent with the plaintiffs' express disclaimer in Section 9.11 of, "any reliance upon any non-party affiliates with respect to any representational warranty made as an inducement to this agreement."

In our view, the contracting parties excluded cases of fraud from the disclaimer of additional representations and warranties in Section 4.8, but chose not to exclude cases of fraud from Section 9.11's disclaimer and release. And I'm going to say this because I believe it. I don't think it's close. So we think that when you look at the specific provisions involved, recognizing the sophistication of the agreement here, 9.11 was intended to release these claims independent of what was ever going on at 4.8. That had to do with a whole different set of subject matters having to do with reps and warranties. So that's our view on

that, Your Honor.

Relative to the -- one of the key things that we've noticed in their complaint is that they take a great deal of issue with so-called opinions of value, and we have lots of reasons for why that is not actionable fraud. And I know you've been down this path many times, Your Honor, as have we and Mr. Feirson, but Rule 12 and Rule 9(b) require you to do certain things. And one of the things that we are fortunate about is that many of the items that are listed in the complaint are referenced. And so we can actually put some of those documents and materials before the Court to see that they are very different than what they're alleged to be in the complaint.

And, therefore, with regard to both the statement of alleged fraud and then reliance on the alleged fraud, et cetera, there are many things that are lacking, from our perspective, relative to the pleading requirements.

And then one key issue that you've seen us raise, and perhaps also our friends at Latham, which is, there's a rather promiscuous use of everybody did everything all at the same time. And that is not acceptable either under the relevant

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      standards.
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                 So our arguments with regard to fraud, I
     think, are well stated. They use a lot of
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     adjectives in their complaint, but that -- but a lot
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     of adjectives doesn't create a relevant or pertinent
     or cognizant fraud claim.
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                 And then one of the issues in the case,
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     Your Honor, is fiduciary duties. And in the
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      fiduciary duty claims, you've seen what we said in
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      our presentation, which is effectively that these --
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      there are no fiduciary duty claims here, that the
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      fiduciary duty issues here are governed by Belgian
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      law, and Belgian law doesn't recognize --
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                 THE COURT: And I'd ask you, please,
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     actually, to pause right there. Thank you so much.
                 MR. McCORMACK: Yes.
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                 THE COURT: That's what confuses me.
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      Does the SRA recite New York law anywhere?
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                 MR. McCORMACK: Yes, it does. It says --
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                 THE COURT: What does it say, please.
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                 MR. McCORMACK: Let me find it and I'll
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     give it to you.
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                 Sorry, Judge. I didn't have that one
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     tagged.
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                 THE COURT: Oh, it's no problem.
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okay.

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MR. McCORMACK: It's Section 9.12,
Governing Law, "This agreement and any claim arising out of or in connection with this agreement shall be governed by, construed and enforced in accordance with the laws of the State of New York without giving effect to any conflict of law, rules or principles that would result in the application of the laws of any other jurisdiction."

And their argument is that that trumps the internal affairs doctrine, and our argument is that it does not. And there's case law in this district that -- it says the same thing that we're saying, that the internal affairs doctrine is not trumped by a choice of law provision in a contract. And there's good reason for that. But as a fundamental question, I appreciate your asking it. Of course, we would brief it if it comes to that, that the internal affairs doctrine of Belgium will apply. And under Belgian law, there is no fiduciary duty owed to shareholders. There is a notional sense of loyalty in Belgium, but that runs only to the company, not to the shareholders. So we'll have a Belgian law affidavit which carefully lays out the reasons why there is no fiduciary duty claim here.

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And then finally, Your Honor -- and I
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     keep going until stopped, Your Honor, as you
     noticed.
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                 THE COURT: Yeah, well -- and I'm going
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     to ask you to pause because, were you here, you'd
     see my hand being raised.
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                Mr. McCormack, with respect to the
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     affidavit that you're contemplating, is it your
     belief that I can consider that in the context of a
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     12(b)(6) motion?
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                MR. McCORMACK: Yes. Our assumption has
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     been that you can.
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                 THE COURT: Okay.
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                MR. McCORMACK: It's a -- and it's funny.
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     I just talked about that yesterday with Robin and
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     Bob. It is a question of law, interestingly. And
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     once you submit such an affidavit -- now that I'm
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     being open, I wondered whether there was an element
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     of question of fact to it, but the case law is a
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     question of law. And so the answer is, yes, I think
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     we can put that in at this motion stage.
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                 THE COURT: Okay. So I'll let you give
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     me your final point. Thank you so much.
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                MR. McCORMACK: Yes, Your Honor.
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                 Just the final point is that -- and this
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has been frustrating for my client, certainly. This is a very comprehensive contract drafted by very sophisticated people which intended to limit entirely the types of claims that could be brought. And relative to the breach of contract claims -- and I don't know if you've seen a lot of it, Your Honor, but this has really gained some force in the corporate world in the last few years, which is they have contracts that eliminate all claims, all common law claims, all statutory claims, all claims except for very specific claims that the parties have been building in their contract. And that's the case here.

And the provisions that are relevant here are really 4.4, which is the actual statement of the reps and warranties that are really the core of the claim, and then an indemnification right. So on the strict breach of contract issues, we would argue that the way that they pled contract claims are inconsistent with the specifics of the provisions in the contract that deal with what was allowed and what wasn't, and that there's specific language in the contract that says, other than these very, very specific things that we'll let a lawsuit proceed on, we don't let anything -- no other statements or

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comments, et cetera, are going to be subject to that.

So our breach of contract defense is, effectively, your breach of contract is wildly inconsistent with the provisions you agreed to relative to the breach of contract claims. that's our pitch on that one, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much. And I do appreciate the detail that you've just given me in your presentation because, again, I'm looking forward to reading the actual documents that go with this. Okay.

And, Mr. McCormack, I think Mr. Feirson has answered this question for you, but I'm understanding from his comments and your presentation to me this morning that it is your client's wish to, first, engage in some dispositive motion practice and then see what remains before discussing ADR. Am I correct?

MR. McCORMACK: Yes, Your Honor. And another thing you should be aware of, because of the nature of these parties and their sophistication, they had a very specific protocol to deal with any kind of issues that might come up after all this ended. And there is a -- Mr. Feirson's client

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Origis USA LLC.

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pressed the button that exists in this SRA to allow
them to seek significant documentation and
information from us prior to a lawsuit being filed.
I think we produced 136,000 pages of documents.
           THE COURT: Oh, okay.
           MR. McCORMACK: And so there has been a
significant amount of information exchanged. But,
you know, on a fundamental level, we talked about --
and I quess Mr. Feirson probably characterized it
exactly right today. There was some conversations,
but I think the parties are so far apart as to what
they think happened here that there wasn't a great
deal of opportunity to settle it until -- to use the
term that litigators -- and sorry, Your Honor,
because you're going to be involved in that, which
is drawing a little blood. So I don't think there's
an appetite for our clients to settle this at this
point, either side.
           THE COURT: Understood. And, again, just
appreciate the candor about that.
           Mr. Denton, may I hear from you, please,
sir.
           MR. DENTON: Yes, Your Honor. Good
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morning. Blake Denton from Latham & Watkins for

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So, Your Honor, you had asked earlier about alter ego, which I think is particularly relevant for my client. My client wasn't the buyer or seller in this transaction. My client didn't get any money from it. My client -- you'll see when you see the SRA, my client didn't make the contractural representations that plaintiffs say were violated. My client wasn't the one providing diligence materials or swearing to their accuracy. My client did no fiduciary duties to the plaintiffs. And so -- and the plaintiffs, in their letter, really don't lay a glove on any of that. And instead, they raise this alter-ego argument that is not in their complaint, and I think for good reason. And I think it would be a mistake for them to add it now against my client.

So, you know, Your Honor already knows that alter-ego claims are, you know, rarely permitted. They -- you know, courts, in general, respect the corporate form, and you need to really fit in a rare exception. And this case certainly is not one of those rare exceptions. Indeed, my client, Origis USA, is not even a wholly owned subsidiary of Origis Energy. And we included a little chart in our pre-motion letter which shows

that.

So my client, USA, was owned 80 percent by Origis Energy and 20 percent by a wholly separate company unrelated to Mr. Vanderhaegen called Global Atlantic, and that's a sophisticated \$70 billion company. It's not a defendant. It's not accused of doing anything wrong. And I think that right there ends any claim that Origis USA and its non-wholly owned parent are somehow one and the same, or Origis USA and Mr. Vanderhaegen are one and the same. And even the cases that plaintiffs' cite in their letter confirm that the American Fuel Corp. case denied alter-ego liability because the company had two shareholders and only one was accused of wrongdoing.

And then further, Your Honor, within USA, there were five directors. Mr. Vanderhaegen was just one of them. In fact, the plaintiffs had double as many seats. They had two. They had more voting power. And so, again, I don't understand how they even can, with a straight face, make the argument that Mr. Vanderhaegen and Origis USA are the same thing. And as Your Honor will see when you see the contract, my client was only party to the contract that's written right on the front cover. Could not be clearer. Origis USA is only party to

the contract for very limited purposes, which is to pay a dividend up to Origis Energy, which is where the plaintiffs' shares are and where the plaintiffs were bought out of and where this entire dispute sits. My client was to pay a dividend up to there that was used to buy out the plaintiffs. And the plaintiffs, as directors of Origis USA, specifically authorized that dividend.

And so, given these facts, I don't know how they can make the argument with a straight face that my client, USA, is somehow the same as

Mr. Vanderhaegen, and Your Honor should disregard the contract, which, right on the front cover, makes clear we're not party to these provisions they claim were breached and, instead, somehow hold us to those, that Your Honor should say that whenever

Mr. Vanderhaegen was negotiating on his own behalf with the plaintiffs for a transaction that personally benefited him and the plaintiffs, that somehow downstream Origis USA is responsible for all that, or on the hook as an alter ego because I don't think any of it makes sense.

And, frankly, it's really unfair, Your
Honor, because, you know, my client, as I mentioned,
didn't get anything out of this transaction. We

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didn't get any money. We didn't -- nothing changed in our structure. We were owned by two entities before. We were owned by those exact same two entities afterwards.
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So my -- USA got no benefit. And the party that later bought USA is Antin Infrastructure Partners. Antin is not alleged to have done anything wrong. Antin was not even on the scene when the plaintiffs were bought out of Origis Energy. The only thing Antin is alleged to have done is to have paid a lot of money when it bought USA a year and change later. And now, the plaintiffs' argument seems to be, well, they should pay a second time. They're trying to hold USA and, you know, by extension, its owner on the hook for something that we were not a part of at all.

And so this lawsuit is having real costs. It's imposing, you know, a real impact on my client's business. And so whether the plaintiffs amend or don't amend, we would like to move to dismiss quickly if they don't do the right thing and just dismiss us out because we're not the right party in this case.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm confident,
Mr. Denton, you've expressed these same thoughts to

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     Mr. Feirson and his team, correct?
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                MR. DENTON: Yes, Your Honor. Sure.
            In our conversations, we've made that clear,
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     Yes.
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      yes.
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                 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Well, I
     mean, not that my opinion matters at this point
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     because it's an under-informed opinion, but I do
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      find the allegations against this Origis Energy to
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     be part -- perhaps the weakest part of plaintiffs'
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      complaint. Plaintiff may be able to remediate it;
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      I'm just not so sure. But I'm -- I am sure that
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     Mr. Feirson and his team will think and think and
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     think some more before deciding finally on who makes
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      it into the next amended complaint.
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                Mr. Feirson, there was a schedule that
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      the parties proposed when the case was in state
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      court. May I please have a sense of the time that
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      you need to file or to consider filing an amended
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     complaint?
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                MR. FEIRSON: Yeah, we would -- if we're
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     going to file an amended complaint, we would intend
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     to do it within the 21 days provided for under
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     Rule 15.
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                 THE COURT: Oh, okay. Although that's
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     what 20 -- are you saying 21 days from today, sir?
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                MR. FEIRSON: Yes, 21 days from today.
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                 THE COURT: Okay. Hold on, please.
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     Sorry. My computer is freezing on me this morning.
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                Would that be June 9th, sir?
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                MR. FEIRSON: Now you're really testing
     me. You're --
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                 THE COURT: Okay. Okay.
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                MR. FEIRSON: I have to look at a
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     calendar.
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                 THE COURT: No, don't do -- please don't
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     do that. June 9th it is.
                 For my friends who are considering filing
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     a motion, is 30 days a sufficient time period to do
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     that, or would you need more time? I -- because I'm
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     looking at -- I guess I'm looking at July 14th, if
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     that works for Mr. McCormack and Mr. Denton.
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                MR. McCORMACK: Your Honor, thank you.
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     One of the things we've seen is that -- I guess it
     depends on what Steve -- I'm sorry -- what
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     Mr. Feirson does with his complaint. If he makes
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     minor additions to it, then that won't change our
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     circumstance, but if he does something more
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     significant, maybe it would. And a couple of
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     things --
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                 THE COURT: I'm sorry. Mr. McCormack,
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you're coming in very faintly. I'm only hearing about half of what you're saying. Could you just repeat that last sentence again. Thank you, sir.

MR. McCORMACK: Sorry about that. I hope this is better.

THE COURT: It is, sir.

MR. McCORMACK: I think it depends on what Mr. Feirson does with his complaint. If he changes three paragraphs and tries to bolster the alter-ego issues, then that won't be much of an issue. We've done a lot of our work already. But if he does something more meaningful to it, then maybe we'd want a little bit more time. So hedging

THE COURT: It will be. It's slightly in tension with Mr. Denton's desire to get this done more quickly.

But, Mr. Denton, my schedule is awful

that risk, I would say 45 days, if that -- if that's

tolerable to you, Your Honor.

anyway, so does July 28th work for you, Mr. Denton?

MR. DENTON: Yes. I think that would

work on our -- and you're correct, Your Honor. I

mean, my client is very eager to try to get out of
this lawsuit as quickly as possible, but if that's

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the best day for the parties, that's fine.

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                 THE COURT: Okay. Now, Mr. Feirson, are
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     you contemplating a single unified brief in response
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     to the two motions?
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                MR. FEIRSON: To be honest, Your Honor, I
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     hadn't thought about that because I hadn't -- I was
     expecting to see the motions and then decide, but
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     my --
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                THE COURT: All right.
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                MR. FEIRSON: -- predilection is to do
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     one unified brief.
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                 THE COURT: Okay.
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                MR. FEIRSON: I think --
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                THE COURT: All right.
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                MR. FEIRSON: Okay.
                THE COURT: So let's imagine, sir --
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     because I'm not interested in extending page limits
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     here, so let's imagine there'll be 25-page briefs
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     from Mr. McCormack and from Mr. Denton's teams. And
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     then you're asking -- at one point, sir, you were
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     asking for 60 days. I did not know whether that was
21
     something you're still requesting.
22
                MR. FEIRSON: Well, obviously, there's no
23
     magic in 60 days, but at least 45 would be good,
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THE COURT: All right.

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Yes.

24

25

Your Honor.

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      going to end up destroying someone's summer holidays
 2
      if I do that, so I will give you until
 3
      September 29th to file your opposition. And then
      let me have, please, reply briefs by October 13th,
 4
 5
      and we'll go from there. What we'll do is we'll
      issue a minute entry that has all of these dates in
 6
     case you weren't able to write them down, but that
 7
 8
      is the schedule for now.
 9
                 Mr. Feirson, from my perspective, I've
10
      addressed the things I wanted to. Is there anything
11
     else you wish to bring to my attention?
12
                 MR. FEIRSON: The only thing is that, as
13
      I'm sitting here thinking about whether it's going
14
     to be one unified brief or two, some of that is
15
     going to depend -- if we're going to have to respond
16
     to 50 pages, our -- is our page limit going to be 25
17
      if it's one?
18
                 THE COURT: No. If it's one brief, it's
19
     one 50-page response.
20
                 MR. FEIRSON: Okay. Thank you, Your
21
     Honor.
22
                 THE COURT: Yes. No, I mean, I'm cruel,
23
     but not unreasonable, so I'm not worried about that.
24
     Okay. Thank you.
25
                 Mr. McCormack, anything else to address
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today, sir?

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MR. McCORMACK: Yes. My team will kill me if I don't raise this issue, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. McCORMACK: We have been working hard on this. As you know, it is a significant case, involves, according to plaintiffs, \$500 million. involves foreign law. It involves multiple causes of action. It involves comprehensive claims of wrongdoing in the form of fraud and misrepresentations. And I know that in our draft briefing to deal with all that, it certainly exceeded the page limits that Your Honor typically uses. I know -- and we had put in, on behalf of all the parties, a request for 35 pages. I was told yesterday that even that was insufficient, but I have the sense that you're not overly inclined to do beyond that, but I'm going to catch a lot of heat from my team off the phone call if I don't ask for at least the 35 pages that we have.

And, again, I'm not wishing to take anything from Latham. I think their arguments are pretty straightforward and similar to what Mr. Blake said today. Ours are a little bit more complicated. They have lots of pieces to them. We're going to

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      write you a good brief and we're going to keep it as
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      short as we can, but it's very difficult to deal
     with everything that's in that complaint and the
 3
      international pieces of it and the law piece,
 5
     everything in that 25 pages. So they begged me to
     come and ask you for 40 pages. I'm going to, now,
 6
     retreat and beg for 35.
 7
 8
                 THE COURT: Okay. I'll give 35 to each
 9
     of you and Mr. Denton.
10
                Mr. Feirson, I'm honor-bound to give you
11
      70, but I have to believe there's some common facts.
12
     You won't need all 70 pages. And for the love of
13
     God, don't ask for more. But I'll give 35 pages,
14
     and then 70 for the -- for a unified opposition
15
     because I don't want to see Mr. McCormack's team
16
     cry, so that's fine.
17
                 So, sir, yes, that has succeeded.
18
                Mr. Denton, anything else to bring to my
19
     attention today?
20
                MR. DENTON: No. Thank you very much for
21
      your time, Your Honor.
22
                 THE COURT: Of course. I thank you all
23
      for your time and for coming prepared to this
24
     conference. I wish you all well. We are adjourned.
25
      Thank you.
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$\texttt{C} \ \texttt{E} \ \texttt{R} \ \texttt{T} \ \texttt{I} \ \texttt{F} \ \texttt{I} \ \texttt{C} \ \texttt{A} \ \texttt{T} \ \texttt{E}$ I, Adrienne M. Mignano, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the case of Pentacon BV v. Vanderhaegen, et al., Docket #23cv2172 was prepared using digital transcription software and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Signature Adrisnns M. Mignano ADRIENNE M. MIGNANO, RPR Date: May 20, 2023